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ABSTRACT
In this chapter, we examine entrepreneurs who carry ideas, technologies, values, and
assumptions between previously unrelated spheres of economic or cultural activity, and in the
process, change the existing order of things. We label such individuals amphibious entrepreneurs
and explore their characteristics via four case studies. Their stories suggest a distinct species
within the genus of entrepreneur: more pragmatic than heroic, and as likely to invent by not
knowing any better as by calculative creation. We discuss their role in creating interstitial spaces,
contrast them to other boundary-spanning actors, and identify directions for future research at the
intersection of social history and entrepreneurship.
Keywords: novelty, invention, amphibiousness, pragmatism, interstitial spaces, boundary
spanning, social history, emergence
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INTRODUCTION
When and why do new kinds of organizations emerge, take root, and persist? The lack of
consensus on this fundamental question suggests that the emergence of novelty, especially of
new categories of people and organizations, is undertheorized in the social sciences.
Explanations of novelty tend to rely on either opportunities created by external shocks or the
insights of unusually talented, creative people. With the former line of thought, the difficulty lies
in pinpointing how social upheavals, technological disruptions, or regulatory changes open up
opportunities for new practices in organizations. The latter approach begs the question of why
some supremely talented, creative people seize particular moments, whereas others fail and are
retrospectively labeled as “ahead of their time.”
We offer a pragmatist account of the emergence of novelty (Cohen 2007; Gilson, Sabel & Scott
2009; Stark 2009). Our perspective highlights the role of amphibious entrepreneurs: people who
simultaneously inhabit multiple social worlds, which affords them the chance to staple together
contradictory principles (Powell & Sandholtz 2012a). People carry skills and networks with them
as they move through the life course. We argue that innovation and invention can result from the
intersection of people, their biographies, and the multiple networks in which they are embedded
(Padgett & Powell 2012).
Our theory of amphibious entrepreneurship begins with two basic premises. First, the
amphibious entrepreneur is deeply immersed in the practices, values, and perspectives of a
particular domain or social world. Second, the amphibious entrepreneur moves from this domain
of immersion to another in which his or her ingrained practices, values, and perspectives are
unknown, alien, and perhaps even heretical. These relatively simple initial conditions are rife
with possibilities for radical novelty but are more likely to result in extinction than innovation,
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precisely because such novelty can be opposed by traditionalists from both sides. But when
transposed practices and values incubate and survive in a new domain, ensuing changes may
spill over and reverberate into distant domains, unleashing large-scale changes in society. We
use this chapter to explore these ideas.
What is an amphibious entrepreneur?
The word amphibian comes from the Greek amphi, meaning both, and bios, meaning life.
Originally, it referred to “living both in water and on land.” Its figurative meaning stems from
the mid-17th century, when amphibian was first used to describe a person “having two modes of
existence or a double character” (Oxford English Dictionary). This duality is central to our
definition of an amphibious entrepreneur: someone who carries social skill and human capital
from one domain into another, and in the process creates novel practices and organizational
models which have the potential to generate whole new lines of activity. The amphibian creates
novelty in two forms: First, innovation can result from the assembly of new types of ties out of
combinations among old ties (a familiar outcome of brokerage). Second, and more radical,
invention can be catalyzed through the tipping of an entire ecology of multiple networks as
innovations trigger chain reactions of novelty (Padgett & Powell 2012).
Consider two examples of the radical novelty we term invention. Both illustrate the process of
transposition through which formerly unassociated practices and ideas are combined and result
in new kinds of action. The first is now widely familiar, mythologized by the book and movie
Moneyball (Lewis 2003). Billy Beane, general manager of Major League Baseball’s Oakland
A’s, found himself in a quandary in the mid-1990s. The club’s owner wouldn’t spend money for
top players yet wanted to field a competitive team. Beane coupled academic financial models
with arcane player statistics called “sabermetrics” to calculate the value of players who had
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cheap contracts but contributed to their team winning more games. Beane’s computational
approach paid off. From 1999 to 2008, the A’s won more games than all but three teams: the
New York Yankees, the Boston Red Sox, and the Atlanta Braves. The average annual payroll for
these three teams was $119 million; for the A’s, it was $48.5 million. The Yankees, Red Sox,
and Braves paid $1.27 million per win during this era; the A’s paid $538,600. Such efficiency
caught the attention of other small-market clubs. In 2008, the Tampa Bay Rays rode an
analytically assembled team to the World Series with a payroll-per-win ratio of less than
$452,000.1 Beane’s statistical approach gained even greater validity when it was embraced by
Theo Epstein, a Beane protégé and GM of one of the richest teams, the Boston Red Sox, who
won the World Series in 2004, 2007, and 2013.
Today, every Major League team has a deep statistical staff. How the game is played has been
altered by analytics, and the backlash against sabermetrics by seasoned veterans has been
defeated. The changes were not confined to the world of baseball, however, or even to the world
of sports. Moneyball is standard reading in business schools. The sabermetric revolution has led
to a broader focus on people analytics (Baumer & Zimbalist 2015). Statistics about the spin rate
of pitches and the exit velocity of baseballs as they come off the bat have parallels in the
corporate world, such as statistical analyses of team formation and staff retention. Google’s
People Analytics department is the poster child for such practices. For example, the company has
changed how it recruits, no longer using brainteasers in interviews because the stats show that
the ability to solve such puzzles does not predict job performance. For the same reason, GPA is
no longer considered for anyone more than two years out of college. The analytics movement

1

Data for these analysis are from two sources. Wins per season are found at Baseball Reference
(https://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/MLB/index.shtml). Opening-day payrolls are found at Steve the
Ump.com (http://www.stevetheump.com/Payrolls.htm#team payrolls).
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originated in academic finance, spread to baseball and other sports, diffused into industry, and
reverberated back into the academy, where big-data analytics and computational social science
have become popular university subjects. Beane stapled together deep knowledge of baseball
with an appreciation for the utility of hard data, drawing on the Black-Scholes (1973) arbitrage
pricing model. He supplemented traditional talent scouts with a new type of analyst: academics
with PhDs in economics, applied math, or statistics but with no first-hand knowledge of baseball.
The cascade of changes unleashed could never have been predicted from Beane’s experience
with the lowly Oakland A’s. As Michael Lewis comments, “It’s hard to think of anyone else like
him. Billy burst out of baseball the way people in baseball really just don’t” (Slusser 2017: All).
A second example comes from the world of haute cuisine. Today, culinary invention is all the
rage, but its origins can, in some sense, be traced to a small town in Catalonia where a young
chef, Ferran Adrià, was given free reign at a small restaurant, El Bulli (Svejenova, Mazza, &
Planellas 2007). Since time immemorial, cooking has involved fire and heat. But drawing from
the world of science, Adrià turned food creation into an R&D lab. He borrowed techniques for
using extreme cold (notably liquid nitrogen) and water baths to “cook” food differently. Initially,
his transgressions were limited to his menu, on which soup appeared as a solid and rabbit as a
liquid. His laboratory approach to running a kitchen encouraged the development of new
practices and these changes were enacted in his organization, in both proactive and reactive ways
(Opazo, 2016). The equipment and technologies that resulted fueled the growth of what has since
been labeled “molecular gastronomy,” an entirely new category of cuisine. Adrià drew heavily
on advances in design and art to radically alter the way his food was presented. His restaurant
featured a set meal presented for 180 days a year, replaced by an entirely new menu the
following year. As the restaurant reached the pinnacle – voted best restaurant in the world five
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years in a row – he closed it. Adrià turned to teaching a course with chemists and physicists at
Harvard University. He now promotes cooking as a form of national identity and economic
development and has created a foundation modeled on the open source community.
These examples illustrate the potential for invention inherent in the collision of formerly distant
social worlds. Black-Scholes and baseball? Molecular chemistry and food preparation? Such
combinations were inconceivable until they happened. By all accounts, however, the front office
of the Oakland A’s and the founding partners of El Bulli were deliberate in their melding of
disparate influences to consolidate a new form of knowledge in their respective fields. The
engine of novelty was transposition, an acknowledged catalyst of large-scale change (Padgett &
McLean 2006; Vedres & Stark 2010). Although the broader repercussions of Beane’s and
Adrià’s efforts could not have been identified a priori, these two pioneers were traditional
entrepreneurs, seeking to innovate in order to gain competitive advantage in their respective
markets.
The idea of the amphibious entrepreneur differs in its emphasis on the role of naïveté in the
emergence of novelty. More pragmatic than heroic, amphibious entrepreneurs are as likely to
generate novelty by not knowing any better as by purposive, calculative creation. Their approach
is simply to move forward with ingrained assumptions in new contexts and, in the process,
generate something unprecedented. Thus, the amphibious entrepreneur is a distinct species
within the genus of entrepreneur: less muscular or instrumental than is often depicted in the
popular press or, sometimes, in the entrepreneurship literature.
Research related to amphibious entrepreneurship
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The term “amphibious entrepreneur” first appeared in a pair of papers chronicling the origins of
the biotech industry (Powell & Sandholtz 2012a, 2012b). These studies analyzed the emergence
of a new-to-the-world organizational form, the “dedicated biotech firm” (DBF), which was an
odd amalgam of practices and values stapled together from the worlds of academic science,
venture capital, and Big Pharma. The amphibians in these cases were renowned molecular
biology and genetics faculty members who came to straddle the worlds of science and
commerce, yet were naïve about the workings of industry. Indeed, many of their founding stories
could be summarized by the phrase, “A funny thing happened on the way to getting my lab
funded.” Their default approach to organizing a startup company was to manage it the way they
ran their university research labs: heavy emphasis on fundamental scientific inquiry; less
attention to commercial success (indeed, many of these startups did not produce a profitable
product that they distributed on their own); open collaboration with universities, non-profit
research centers, and established pharmaceutical companies; and insistence on publishing
scientific breakthroughs (after patenting them) rather than keep them secret. In effect, DBFs
were elite research labs funded by venture capital. As some of these firms began to produce
blockbuster drugs to treat previously untreatable diseases, the “oddball” practices that had been
assembled by amphibious founders began to change how venture capitalists invested, the way
Big Pharma conducted research, and the way academic scientists conducted their research and
managed their careers. (A more complete account of the origins and impact of the biotech
industry is available in Powell & Sandholtz 2012a and 2012b.)
Building on these initial ideas, the concept of amphibiousness has been applied in a variety of
settings. We briefly comment on three such applications. First, entrepreneurship research has
started to explore the role of amphibious processes in the formation of new enterprises. For
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example, a recent review by Fisher, Kotha, and Lahiri (2016) unpacks an important aspect of
amphibious entrepreneurship by examining how legitimacy in one domain can be transferred to a
new domain. Such “stocks of legitimacy” can come from “the positive prior reputation of the
people within the venture” (Fisher et al. 2016: 400; italics in original) – even if the
entrepreneur’s reputation is in a different arena. On the other hand, the practices and values from
a prior domain can become a liability in the new domain. For example, the authors describe how
as entrepreneurs “cross between academia and industry” they may “encounter the contradictory
expectations of the scientific and business communities,” leading not only to an identity crisis for
the entrepreneurs but a legitimacy crisis for the new venture (Fisher et al. 2016: 396). Fisher et
al. point out that such entrepreneurs must use these contradictory pressures to fashion new
models of organizing or risk being pulled down by the constraints of existing protocols.
Second, Patriotta and Hirsch (2016) theorize how innovation occurs and becomes accepted in art
worlds. They argue that innovation results from simultaneous changes in network structures and
institutional categories. Structurally, unknown artists (“outsiders”) move from the periphery to
the core of an art world as their ideas become more accepted, thus enabling them to gain access
to resources. At the same time, existing artistic categories and conventions are questioned and
new conventions legitimized as artistic “mavericks” become recognized as “mainstreamers.”
Patriotta and Hirsch (2016: 874) describe the role played by “amphibious artists,” who can start
out as either mainstreamers or mavericks: “We see these boundary spanners as less distant from
mainstreamers, for while they are socially separated, they promote exchanges between core and
periphery, and help expand mainstream conventions into new direction.” Their illustrative case is
the rise and acceptance of independent cinema in the U.S. Their amphibious artist is Robert
Redford, an acclaimed mainstream actor, director, and producer, who lent legitimacy and
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resources to the world of independent cinema through his sponsorship and cultivation of the
Sundance Film Festival. Originally an anti-Hollywood forum, the festival has grown into an
international phenomenon that offers independent filmmakers access and exposure to major
Hollywood studios. At the same time, Hollywood filmmaking has become more “indie” in its
approach, incorporating into many of its large-budget projects the rawness and vibrancy
associated with formerly peripheral artists (Perren 2012).
Third, research on social movements has begun to explore the emergence of “tactical
innovation,” defined as the creation or adoption of tactics that had not previously been used by
established social movement organizations (Wang and Soule 2016). Analyzing more than 23,000
protest events in the U.S. from 1960 to 1995, Wang and Soule show that at events where
formerly separate social issues were being protested – women’s rights combined with
gay/lesbian rights, for example – novel amalgams of disparate protest tactics were much more
likely to be deployed. As the authors put it, “multi-issue protests can generate recombinatorial
tactical innovation when multiple groups representing different interests join together” (Wang
and Soule 2016: 522). Although this research does not explore the action of amphibious
individuals or groups, the mechanism articulated has amphibious contours: “protest events that
span dissimilar claims make it possible for participants to cross boundaries separating the tactical
repertoires associated with different movements” (Wang & Soule 2016: 537). The authors
advocate future studies that examine these boundary-crossing processes at a more granular level
in order to identify the role of individual protest leaders and social movement organizers in the
emergence of novel tactics.
We are encouraged by the increasing overlap between research on social movements and
entrepreneurship studies (Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert 2005; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009). An
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intriguing recent study in this vein is Mora’s (2014) analysis of the emergence and creation of
the pan-ethnic category of Hispanic. In 1970, the category of Hispanic or Latino did not exist in
the U.S. Mexican Americans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Columbians, Guatemalans, and so on,
came from different class backgrounds and had divergent immigrant experiences. By the mid1980s, however, they were united under the category Hispanic. How? Mora (2014) argues that
“cross-field effects” made this new category of persons possible. The disparate efforts of
political activists, Spanish-speaking media companies, advertisers, and the U.S. Census came
together to create an unusual convergence. Bureaucrats, media execs, and political activists not
only formed links with one another, but they transposed and exploited each other’s frames. The
television channel Univision transposed census data into a marketing manual and borrowed the
“underrepresented minorities” frame from activists in appeals to TV regulators. In turn, activists
used census and marketing data to depict Hispanics as a new political force. These
recombinations came together as activists and executives borrowed frames that had been
developed in different contexts to create a novel political and economic community.
More generally, social movement research helps us think about how different forms of boundary
spanning can lead to novelty. Snow et al. (1986) developed the idea of frame extension to
capture a process by which activists in one movement broaden their political goals to attract
constituencies outside their core supporters. On occasion, such moves can create unexpected new
political communities. More recently, Wang and Piazza (2016) analyze multi-issue protest
events, which have the chance to garner more attention and support, but like any amphibious
move, have the inherent difficulty of maintaining fidelity to multiple constituencies.
These studies evidence a fledgling scholarly literature examining amphibiousness as a catalyst of
broader social novelty. Limitations in this literature include the relative paucity of illustrative
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cases in general, and the absence of failure cases in particular. The first limitation could foster
criticism that amphibiousness is sui generis to the worlds of biotech or art. The second limitation
leaves room for skepticism regarding success bias (although see Powell & Sandholtz 2012b for a
response to this criticism). In addition, to be a more useful construct, the dimensions of what
amphibiousness is and is not need to be more clearly delineated.
To that end, we present four cases of amphibious entrepreneurship: Ed Catmull and the crossfertilization between computer science and big-budget filmmaking that created mass-market
computer-animated films; Jacqueline Novogratz and the emergence of Acumen, a nonprofit
venture capital firm; Carlos Santana and the invention of Latin rock, a new musical genre; and
Victoria Hale, who created a nonprofit pharmaceutical company that fell short of disrupting both
Big Pharma and the nonprofit world. After presenting the cases, we return to our definition of
amphibious entrepreneurs, focusing on how amphibians create social interstices and drawing out
the similarities and differences between amphibious entrepreneurs and other boundary-spanning
roles.
CASE STUDIES
Case 1: Ed Catmull and the birth of digital animation
On November 22, 1995, Pixar’s animated feature film Toy Story was released to critical acclaim.
One week later, Pixar raised $140 million in the largest IPO of 1995. Animated filmmaking has
never been the same. Pixar’s blend of new-to-the-world technology and ages-old storytelling has
had repercussions throughout Hollywood, resulting in the reinvention of Disney Animation and
the entire animated film industry. Such large-scale impact is achieved through the efforts of
thousands of people and millions of events, yet if any one individual set it in motion, it was Ed
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Catmull, a reluctant entrepreneur whose deep expertise in computer science, transposed to the
world of movie making, catalyzed the digital revolution in animation.
Catmull grew up in Salt Lake City during the optimistic post-WWII years. His two childhood
heroes were Albert Einstein and Walt Disney (Hollar 2013: 2), foreshadowing the blend of
science and entertainment that would eventually shape Pixar. He loved drawing and was
fascinated by animation, but he also excelled in math and science in high school. Unable to find
a college that taught animation, he chose science, graduating with a double major in physics and
computer science from the University of Utah.
After being laid off from a low-level programming job at Boeing, Catmull returned to Utah to
pursue a PhD. He chose computer science over physics because in computer science “we were at
the frontier, whereas with physics . . . you had another four to six years ahead of you to get to the
frontier” (Hollar 2013: 6). Catmull was unaware that the university’s computer science
department, led by David Evans and Ivan Sutherland, was breaking new ground in computergenerated graphics. As department chair, Evans’ instinct was to create a rich, interdisciplinary
environment with ample funding and plenty of freedom. Catmull recalls:
One of the interesting things about Utah at that . . . it was the one place where both the
fields [computer science and image processing] were together. And it was part of the
development of computer graphics to have the image processing side alongside it. After
that, at the universities they were not together. They tend to be in computer graphics and
there's image processing. But Utah started off not only with them together, but, in the
middle of the department they had a photography lab. So we had a professional
photographer running this lab in the middle of the program to help make some pictures.
(Hollar 2013: 9)
Catmull’s first graduate course was a computer graphics seminar taught by Ivan Sutherland.
“There were no textbooks,” Catmull remembers. “Ivan Sutherland came in wearing flip flops and
I thought he was one of the hippie graduate students” (Hollar 2013: 7). In that seminar, Catmull
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wrote a program to digitize and animate his left hand. His work resulted in a paper published in
the 1972 Proceedings of the ACM Annual Conference entitled “A System for ComputerGenerated Movies.” More importantly, the seminar helped Catmull crystallize his personal
mission:
. . . fairly quickly I realized that there was incredible potential in making pictures. Those
first pictures were black and white. They were polygonal. They had jaggies along the
edges. They were very crude. Everything was crude. But you could see the computers are
getting faster and that here's something to pursue. That's when I connected the dots to
say, "Oh, I can use this for making art.” And once I took that class, everything shifted. I
was no longer pursuing computer languages. Everything was about, “How do I develop
the technologies so that we can do curved surfaces and animate them and get us to the
point where we can make movies with them?” (Hollar 2013: 8)
Note the focus of Catmull’s vision: solving a thorny technical problem in order to create art. He
was decidedly uninterested in traditional entrepreneurship; two of his Utah professors were in the
throes of starting a company (the pioneering computer graphics firm, Evans & Sutherland).
Catmull witnessed the startup world and wanted no part of it. Instead, he interviewed for
academic jobs but received no offers. Computer animation was too far out: “Each time I
expressed that goal in job interviews at universities, it seemed to cast a pall over the room. ‘But
we want you to teach computer science,’ my interviewers would say” (Catmull 2014: 20; italics
in original). With few other options, he took a job in 1974 at Applicon, a small Boston-based
computer-aided design company. In less than a year, however, he was recruited to build from
scratch a computer animation research lab at the New York Institute of Technology.
NYIT had been founded by Alex Schure, an eccentric multimillionaire with a passion for using
computers to make movies. He provided Catmull with cutting-edge equipment (purchased,
appropriately, from Evans & Sutherland), ample space, unlimited funding to hire bright people,
and complete freedom. Catmull, of course, replicated the only management structure and culture
he knew, that of the U of U’s computer science department: “I created a flat organizational
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structure, much like I’d experienced in academia, largely because I naively thought that if I put
together a hierarchical structure . . . I would have to spend too much time managing and not
enough time on my own work” (Catmull 2014: 24). He assembled a crack technical team to
begin solving fundamental technical challenges. They published all of their findings – a stark
contrast to commercially oriented competitors, who “embraced a culture of strictly enforced,
even CIA-like secrecy.” Catmull (2014: 25) explains:
My view was that we were all so far from achieving our goal that to hoard ideas only
impeded our ability to get to the finish line. Instead, NYIT engaged with the computer
graphics community, publishing everything we discovered, participating in committees to
review papers written by all manner of researchers, and taking active roles at all the
major academic conferences. The benefit of this transparency was not immediately felt
(and, notably, when we decided upon it, we weren’t even counting on a payoff; it just
seemed like the right thing to do).
To this point, Catmull’s biography amply illustrates the first condition for amphibious
entrepreneurship: deep immersion in a particular social domain. Catmull and his group at NYIT
produced a stream of research that laid the foundation for the field of computer animation
(Hollar 2013: 15). The second condition – relocation to an utterly foreign domain – happened in
1979 when Catmull was recruited to run a newly formed computer animation group at
Lucasfilm. Flush with the success of Star Wars (1977), George Lucas had the vision and the
resources to push the frontiers of digital filmmaking. Such techniques were foreign to Hollywood
at the time, however. Catmull, while running NYIT’s animation lab, had made numerous
overtures to the major studios, searching for a collaboration partner. As he puts it, “It’s hard to
imagine now, but in 1976, the idea of incorporating high technology into Hollywood filmmaking
wasn’t just a low priority; it wasn’t even on the radar” (Catmull 2014: 25).
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At Lucasfilm, Catmull continued to staff and manage his animation group the only way he knew
how: like a university CS department. His approach continued to emphasize openness, research,
and publishing:
. . . the foundations were put in place in Utah and then confirmed at New York Tech. . . .
[T]he number of things that it takes to put together any development is just vast. If you
look at it that way, what is the important thing you want? It’s the people that keep coming
up with ideas. And when we participated in the broader community, the computer
graphics community and the film community, we were connecting with people. We were
sharing ideas. We may have given away some of our secret ideas, but what we were
getting back were ideas from other people. And a lot of those great people wanted to
come work with us. So, when we came to Lucasfilm, I’d say a lot of people said they
were coming not because it was Lucasfilm or even because it was Star Wars. It was
because of this open group.
“. . . we continued to publish, and the company and George [Lucas] never had a problem
with that. . . . So we published lots and lots of papers. There were several years when
more papers were from Lucasfilm than any place else. And we still do this at Pixar –
publish, go to the conferences, invite people here. It’s bigger than any of us. Let’s enjoy
it.” (Hollar 2013:18)
In essence, Catmull was running an elite academic research group within a for-profit corporation,
buffered from economic realities by the extraordinary financial success of the Star Wars
franchise. Lucasfilm felt “as protected as an academic institution,” says Catmull (2014:29), “an
idea that would stay with me and help shape what I would later try to build at Pixar.” The
protections vanished in 1983, when in the wake of George Lucas’ divorce, Lucasfilm was cashstrapped and decided to sell its graphics division. Catmull’s group struggled for three years to
find a buyer; their only product was a high-end piece of hardware (the Pixar Image Computer)
that lacked a clearly defined market. At the brink of disbanding, the graphics group was rescued
by Steve Jobs, who purchased them from Lucasfilm for $5 million in 1986. Pixar was born, but
on life support. Catmull’s academia-influenced modus operandi was not well suited to running a
product business. Were it not for Jobs’ cash and deal-making prowess, Pixar would have gone
bankrupt. At the same time, were it not for Catmull’s vision, implemented through his penchant
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for assembling technical talent to pursue cutting-edge projects, Pixar’s company-saving and
world-changing hit – Toy Story – would never have happened.
In a 2008 Harvard Business Review article, Catmull describes his management style – his
preference for openness, equality, freedom, and the constant testing of assumptions – as an
inheritance of his formative years in academia and research. Transposed to the world of
commercial filmmaking, these academic practices and values almost killed Pixar. Having
survived, however, the company’s unconventional practices have had far-reaching impact in
multiple domains: in animated filmmaking, obviously, but also in management studies, where
Catmull’s 2014 book, Creativity, Inc., has become a staple in corporate seminars and MBA
classrooms, and where management scholars study Pixar’s approach to innovation (Mannucci
2017). Even computer science has been affected; computer animation groups are de rigueur in
any serious CS department. Catmull is known and respected in Hollywood, at Harvard Business
School, and at SIGGRAPH – evidence of true amphibiousness.
Case 2: Jacqueline Novogratz and the invention of nonprofit venture capital
Jacqueline Novogratz was born to be a philanthropist. Her religious upbringing imbued her with
a sense of responsibility to her fellow beings and a desire to make a difference in the world. Yet
her family was firmly middle class; she didn’t have financial wherewithal to instantly enter the
philanthropic world as a donor. She resolved to educate herself, then look for opportunities to
apply her knowledge and idealism to the world’s toughest problems. She paid her way through
the University of Virginia, graduating in 1983 with a degree in international relations and a bias
for meaningful, service-oriented work.
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At this point, her trajectory took an unexpected turn. Lacking any concrete job prospects in the
public sector, she added her resume to the stacks for international relations and economics grads
in the university placement office. Unexpectedly, she was invited to interview for a job with
Chase Manhattan Bank. Her account of the interview is comical (Novogratz 2009:5-6). The
recruiter’s first question was, “Tell me why you want to be a banker.” Novogratz told the truth:
“I don’t want to be a banker. I want to change the world.” The recruiter was somehow able to
convince her that international banking would allow her to do just that. Thus began her intense
training in international lending, coupled with extended visits to financial centers in the third
world. Since that time, Novogratz has described herself as “an accidental banker” (PBS 2016).
If working as an international banker schooled her in the fundamental tools of capitalism,
traveling the world acquainted her with the plight of the poor. After three years with Chase – a
time she describes as “a stunning, privileged education” (Novogratz 2009:7) – she approached
her boss with a novel idea. She had spent many months in Brazil, analyzing debt write-offs
during the week and connecting with people in the city’s favelas on weekends (Novogratz
2009:8):
The bank doors were closed to the poor and working class. Because the commercial
banks were writing off millions in bad debts to the richest sectors of society, they were in
no mood to try lending to the poorest. I suggested to my boss that an experiment, even a
small one, to lend to Brazil’s working class might actually provide better results than
lending to the rich. He patted me on the head and reminded me of the poor’s lack of
collateral, the high transaction costs of making small loans, and the culture of poverty,
which would result in no one repaying – insinuating that I was naïve and misguided. The
conversation went from bad to worse. I disagreed with him on the culture of poverty and
repeated my idea for an experiment. He told me the point was moot and that I should
think about how and if I wanted to pursue my long-term career goals at Chase.
Novogratz describes this conversation as a defining moment in her career; it also illustrates many
of the core elements of amphibiousness: the naivete, the clash between the fundamental values of
different domains, and the incomprehensibility of traditional practices when imagined in a
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radically different context. After this conversation, Novogratz began looking for a way to take
the tools she had mastered as a banker and apply them to helping the world’s poor. Her next job
was with the United Nations Childrens’ Fund, which took her to Africa to help grow
microfinance organizations that would lend to women entrepreneurs. The year was 1986;
Novogratz recollects that “the big argument [in microfinance] was whether it was ethical to
charge any interest at all, and I was one of those who believed that we should charge interest”
(Javetski 2009). Her work led to an expanding range of opportunities, including stints with the
World Bank and projects in various African countries. She saw so many failed philanthropic
projects that she began an earnest search for a way to help the poor grow their own businesses
rather than live off the unpredictable generosity of others.
Her quest took her from the microfinance organization she had helped found in Rwanda to one of
the world’s bastions of entrepreneurship: the Graduate School of Business at Stanford, where she
earned an MBA. Reflecting on her time at Stanford, Novogratz (2009:121) says that her
professors and fellow students were “comfortable speaking about power and money. Love and
dignity, on the other hand, were words people were often embarrassed to say aloud, or so it felt.
There had to be a way to combine the power, rigor, and discipline of the marketplace with the
compassion I’d seen in so many other programs aimed at the very poor.”
Novogratz’s zig-zag path between traditional capitalism and third-world development continued
after her graduation from Stanford in 1991. She accepted a fellowship at the Rockefeller
Foundation, a role from which she gained a much deeper understanding of what might be termed
“Big Philanthropy.” Her travels took her all over the world again, yet she was growing
dissatisfied with the workings of traditional philanthropy:

20

At the end of 1999, I was sitting with the new president of the Rockefeller Foundation,
Sir Gordon Conway, in his 22nd-floor office overlooking Manhattan, sharing my
frustrations about traditional philanthropy, remarking that it often lacked clear measures
and accountability and seemed at times more focused on making donors feel good than
on effecting change. The world needed a new kind of institution, I said, one built on the
best lessons and precepts of philanthropy but also utilizing business approaches and
concepts . . . one that would amass philanthropic money, have the flexibility to make
grants or investments in both nonprofit and for-profit organizations, and take a few big
bets on enterprises that delivered critical services to the poor, all to ensure that lowincome communities could actually be part of the solution. We would build more
transparency and accountability into the work at all levels and treat the poor as customers
with a real voice, not as passive recipients of charity (Novogratz 2009:213-14).
Novogratz realized her vision in 2001 with the founding of the Acumen Fund. Acumen is an odd
mix of a charity and a traditional investment fund – a nonprofit venture capital fund whose goal
is to use entrepreneurial approaches to address global poverty. Its stated aim is to demonstrate
that “small amounts of philanthropic capital, combined with large doses of business acumen, can
build thriving enterprises that serve vast numbers of the poor” (Ebrahim and Rangan 2011:1).
The new approach taken at Acumen involved raising charitable funds from individuals,
foundations, and corporations, which in turn would be invested as equity or debt in enterprises
serving bottom-of-the-pyramid markets. The enterprises could be nonprofit organizations with an
earned-income revenue model or for-profit businesses. The target organizations had to be
focused on delivering services to the poor in one of five areas: water, healthcare, housing,
energy, or agriculture. Novogratz’ experience at Stanford taught her the wisdom of the venture
capital model, in which investors not only offer financial backing but also managerial know how
and experience in business planning, strategy, performance management, and executive training.
Such efforts at capacity building, as they have long been called in the international development
world, were almost unheard of in organizations that served disadvantaged populations. Acumen
believed that these services were essential to creating viable enterprises that could eventually
stand on their own. Acumen’s typical financial investment would involve a commitment of five
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to seven years; by contrast, the more traditional investments of philanthropic grant makers are
from one to three years and venture capital firms bankroll startups for three to four years: “Our
investment style was focused on what we termed patient capital—not traditional charity, not
traditional business investment, but something in-between. Patient capital is money invested over
a longer period of time with the acknowledgement that returns might be below market, but with a
range of management support services to nurture the company to liftoff and beyond” (Novogratz
2009: 229).
Novogratz’ amphibiousness enabled her to borrow investment criteria from realms that had little
prior contact with one another. One criterion was the potential for significant social impact.
Acumen invests with the purpose of increasing or upgrading the outputs of enterprises. A second
criterion was the potential for an organization to reach financial sustainability within a sevenyear period. A third criterion was the potential to achieve scale, defined as reaching
approximately one million users within seven years. One of its early investments were in the
Aravind Eye Hospital in India, which has become a pioneer in the provision of eve surgery
throughout India (Rangan, 2009). The hospital’s R&D arm designed and manufactured
intraocular lenses (used in cataract surgery) for less than $10 (the cost at the time was $140 per
lens). Another investment was in A-to-Z Textile Mills, a Tanzanian company that manufactures
long-lasting insecticide-treated antimalarial bed nets. Within seven years, A-to-Z became one of
the largest employers in Tanzania, hiring more than 7,000 people and producing 19 million bed
nets per year.
By bringing business acumen to the realm of international development, Acumen has built a new
organizational model and disseminated entrepreneurial ideas to the challenge of alleviating
poverty. To promote lessons from its portfolio of investments, Acumen uses various means of
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communication. It distributes regular email newsletters, actively engages with a half million
followers via Twitter and Facebook, and publishes a blog to broadcast activities, partnerships,
and lessons. Acumen also offers a fellowship program for young professionals, as well as free
online courses and volunteering opportunities to share its distinctive vision. One course,
Storytelling for Change, teaches participants how to use powerful stories to connect with
audiences and change conversations. Acumen’s board of directors reflects it recombinatorial
model, drawing people from the worlds of philanthropy, international aid, private equity, venture
capital, and leading foundations.
Acumen’s efforts have rebounded back into the worlds of international development and venture
philanthropy. So-called “impact investing” was largely unheard of in 2001 when Acumen was
founded but has since become a common topic of discussion (Brest, Gilson, and Wolfson, 2016).
Such forms of investing, in either nonprofits or socially-minded for-profit ventures, are now
typical of such firms as Bridges Ventures, the Omidyar Network, and the Gates Foundation. The
recent move toward limited liability corporations (LLCs) in the philanthropic world in part
reflects a desire to be able to invest in both nonprofit and for-profit social-purpose entities.
Capacity building in the form of organizational training and upgrading has also become much
more common in both the philanthropy and international development worlds. In short, what
started out as Jacqueline Novogratz’ oxymoronic vision – a nonprofit venture fund, designed to
serve the global poor – has reverberated back into the worlds of philanthropy and foreign aid, as
well as parts of the financial community. As Novogratz puts it,
When we started in 2000, 2001, it was a pretty uncrowded field. We were pretty much
one of the only—well, maybe the only player at the very beginning that was using
philanthropic money and investing equity in loans in for-profit companies. Now, it’s a
crowded field. Now there are other players who are coming in under the rubric of venture
philanthropy or social-impact investing—you know, all across. (Javetski 2009)
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Case 3: Carlos Santana and the Latin rock revolution
A skinny Mexican immigrant playing blues licks on the streets of 1960s San Francisco may seem
an unlikely musical pioneer. That immigrant was Carlos Santana, who learned the violin at age
five and the guitar at age eight. He grew up in Mexico at the confluence of two unrelated musical
worlds: the Latin music of his parents (his father was a mariachi musician), with its Afro-Cuban
rhythms and extensive use of horns and percussion; and the guitar-driven, blues-based world of
rock-n-roll, popular among Mexican teens. In the words of Tufts University anthropologist
Deborah Pacini Hernandez (2010: 1-2), “Santana filtered [Latin music’s] Spanish Caribbean
sensibilities through his own deep knowledge of U.S. rock, which he had become familiar with
not in the United States but in his Mexican homeland, where young people had embraced rock
since the 1950s.”
Santana’s family moved to San Francisco in the late 1950s; Carlos graduated from Mission High
School in 1965. Both the place and the time were musically unique. San Francisco in the 1960s
was a laboratory of rock experimentation, spawning musical innovators such as Jefferson
Airplane, the Grateful Dead, and Janis Joplin. Skipping college, Santana began gigging with a
group he called the Santana Blues Band. Santana’s deep knowledge of and appreciation for Latin
music was reflected in both the composition of the band, which included Latin percussionists
playing timbales and congas, and the songs that the band wrote and covered.
Crucial in the development of the band’s sound was the fact that they shared a house and
swapped records, exposing the band members to a wide variety of musical styles. As drummer
Mike Shrieve recalls, “When I moved in with the guys in the band, it was really fascinating to
me because everybody had their own records. Music was going all the time but everyone was
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sharing” (Contreras 2016). Santana adds, “Everyone was bringing their own love affair or what
they liked, you know. Michael Shrieve was bringing Coltrane and Miles and Elvin Jones.
[Percussionists] Carabello and Chipito were bringing Tito Puente, Eddie Palmieri, and Ray
Barretto. For me, it was just basically blues. I would listen to John Lee Hooker, Lightnin’
Hopkins, and Jimmy Reed.” The confluence of these musical influences created the opportunity
for novel recombinations, one of which launched an entirely new genre – Latin Rock – that has
had lasting influence on both traditional Latin music and mainstream rock.
Santana describes becoming interested in melding the Caribbean music he was raised on with the
hard-driving blues he had grown to love. In his words, “I was getting more and more fascinated
with how to cross pollinate Tito Puente with B.B. King” (Contreras 2016) – an unlikely
combination, to be sure. Tito Puente was a New York-born band leader of Puerto Rican descent
whose music was popular in the Latino world but had never crossed over to non-Latin listeners.
By the same token, rock and blues had never made use of the textures and rhythms of AfroCuban percussion. A prime example of Santana’s unique, genre-busting sound is his reinvention
of a Puente composition, “Oye Como Va!” Santana substituted blues-derived guitar licks and
Hammond B3 organ punches for Puente’s horns, but kept the underlying cha-cha rhythm. Pacini
Hernandez (2010:2) explains, “Ironically, it was an immigrant Mexican rocker who, in
pioneering the subgenre of Latin rock, introduced the U.S.-born Puente’s Afro-Cuban dance
music to mainstream U.S. rock audiences.”
Santana’s influence extended beyond the U.S., of course. His version of “Oye Como Va!” hit
number 13 on Billboard’s Top 100 chart and, in the process, introduced Latin music to a
worldwide fan base. In 2000, National Public Radio’s All Things Considered included “Oye
Como Va!” among the 100 most important American songs of the 20th century, “a decision based
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on its profound influence on musical developments in the United States” (Pacini Hernandez
2010: 2). In announcing the award, NPR quoted Cesar Rosas, Mexican-born lead guitarist for the
Latin rock group, Los Lobos, regarding the impact of Santana’s music: “Carlos Santana created a
new kind of music. . . . He fused together two awesome elements, the most romantic two
elements ever: one being rock-n-roll, which is very romantic, electric guitar, blues-based; and
then he also picked Latin music, which is extremely romantic. And when he fused those two
together, it just exploded” (Welna 2000).
Carlos Santana has since recorded with artists in a variety of styles, including critically
acclaimed albums of mainstream jazz. Indeed, he might be called “multiphibious,” due to his
facility with bending and crossing musical genres. Santana explains his genius matter-of-factly:
“I just rely on a portfolio or rolodex in my brain” (Contreras 2016). Felix Contreras, host of
NPR’s alt.latino radio show, credits Santana with setting in motion a “magical process of
transformation and creation in which the band combined unrelated styles and genres to create a
sound that is still popular 50 years later.”
Case 4: Victoria Hale and the struggle to create a nonprofit pharmaceutical firm
Victoria Hale received her Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy from the University of Maryland
(Baltimore) in 1983. After two years as a clinical pharmacist at the Johns Hopkins Medical
Institutions, she continued her studies at the University of California at San Francisco, earning a
Ph.D. in pharmaceutical chemistry in 1990. Rather than remain in academia, she took a job with
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as a reviewer in the Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research. During her five-year tenure there, she witnessed what happens to medicines for
unprofitable markets. A pharmaceutical firm was developing a new drug for two promising
indications. One was a potential blockbuster; the other was an orphan disease, a label given to
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diseases that affect fewer than 200,000 people worldwide. The firm’s executives decided to
focus on the blockbuster and abandon the orphan disease because it distracted the company from
the more profitable indication. In addition, as a member of the FDA’s pilot drug evaluation staff,
Dr. Hale became familiar with compounds that were seeking approval for a single disease but
could be extended to cure other diseases. This sparked an idea: If an organization could obtain
the rights to these half-developed compounds and tweak them to solve neglected diseases, it
would be a win-win (Mair, 2005).
From the FDA, Dr. Hale moved to Genentech, one of the earliest and most successful biotech
companies. Genentech had close ties with UCSF and was focused on developing new-to-theworld medicines, but not on products for diseases in the developing world. Although Dr. Hale’s
career moved quickly at Genentech, she could not escape the idea of creating an alternative kind
of pharmaceutical company. After three years, she left to devote full attention to a unique new
venture that would become the Institute for One World Health (IOWH).
Dr. Hale’s time at the FDA had given her a first-hand understanding of the drug approval
process. Her experience at Genentech had exposed her to the commercial side of bringing new
drugs to market, including the bias toward products designed to treat diseases in the Global
North. Dr. Hale began developing the moral view that life-saving drugs should be available for
everyone who needs them. As she told the Stanford Social Innovation Review in 2007,
When there are blockbuster opportunities that generate significant revenues, the
pharmaceutical industry runs to them. But when there are opportunities that affect very,
very poor people, the industry doesn’t respond very well. That was the position that
global infectious diseases were in. So the question was simple: If the barrier to
developing drugs for these medicines is the profitability requirement, then it should be
possible to develop these medicines within a pharmaceutical company that doesn’t have
that profitability requirement (Nee 2007).
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In pursuing her vision of a non-profit pharmaceutical company, she was swimming against the
tide. IOWH was conceived as a nonprofit company in an industry that has long been one of the
most profitable of global enterprises. Potential investors reacted with the confusion that often
meets amphibious entrepreneurs:
Research and development costs for new medicines are in the tens of millions of dollars.
The traditional sources of funding that would lead to a for-profit entity–venture capital–
just didn’t work. We couldn’t even get two minutes in front of a venture capitalist. . . .
We were an oxymoron, something that people would laugh at and say, “Oh, that’ll never
work” (Nee 2007).
Dr. Hale exhibited the naïveté typical of amphibious entrepreneurs: “I talked to lots of people
about my idea in the beginning—and I didn’t listen to them, or I wouldn’t be here. I talked to one
former executive from a big pharmaceutical company and he said, ‘You won’t be successful. It
takes at least 10,000 people to make a drug’” (Hayden 2007). Undaunted, Dr. Hale officially
launched the non-profit IOWH with her husband, Ahvie Herskovitz, in July 2000. IOWH’s
mission was to focus on neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), a designation that includes a variety
of parasitic illnesses such as trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), leishmaniasis (black fever),
and Chagas disease, all common to the tropics. That same year, the World Health Organization
had designated these as the three main neglected diseases, estimating that less than 10 percent of
global spending on health research was devoted to diseases or conditions that account for 90
percent of the global disease burden. Notably, of the 1,391 new drugs approved in Europe and
the U.S. between 1975 and 1999, only 16 were indicated for tropical diseases (Mair, 2005).
Indeed, only four compounds for tropical diseases were developed by commercial
pharmaceutical companies over this time period.
Drawing on her experience at Genentech and the FDA, Dr. Hale designed a new business model
to tackle the challenge of developing medicines for NTDs. IOWH could not realistically take a
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drug from research to production; it had to focus on the phases of the drug-development process
it could affect. As Dr. Hale explained in a 2007 interview,
We’re in downtown San Francisco, so we don’t have a factory and we don’t have any
laboratories. We partner to do our laboratory work and our manufacturing. We do hold on
to the ‘D,’ the development part, where you’re doing animal studies and clinical trials.
But for the ‘R,’ we really do need to partner with the inventors of the technology (Nee
2007).

IOWH raised funds through traditional philanthropic channels and found promising compounds
through contacts with the pharmaceutical industry and research universities. By seeking
compounds that incumbent firms had chosen not to develop, IOWH would continue the research
process, eventually leading to preclinical and clinical tests and regulatory approval. Then it
would find partners to handle the manufacturing and distribution of the drugs in underserved,
third-world markets. IOWH obtained royalty-free licenses and patent donations for compounds
from smaller biotech companies and several universities, as well as a few donations of
compounds that large pharma companies.
Although the idea of a nonprofit pharmaceutical company was unusual, Dr. Hale was able to
attract donors. For example, the Gates Foundation provided her with seed money and became a
major partner. The WHO alerted IOWH to an off-patent antibiotic for the treatment of visceral
leishmaniasis (black fever), which was killing 200,000 people per year and afflicting many more.
This antibiotic (paromomycin) had been donated to the WHO by an Italian drug company, which
held the license. The WHO had run out of funding for its clinical trials but was keen to partner
with IOWH. In addition to black fever, sleeping sickness, and river blindness, IOWH also
received licenses for a promising new drug against Chagas disease donated by Celera Genomics.
Licenses and donations from academia followed, with Yale University and the University of
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Washington providing royalty-free licenses to compounds that might also be useful in treating
Chagas disease. The University of California Santa Barbara donated a patent that could lead to a
potential treatment for schistosomiasis.
As has been mentioned, IOWH operated differently from large pharmaceutical firms and even
small biotech companies in that its goal was to develop drugs for which no significant market
existed. But it also differed from international public health organizations in that IOWH had the
capability to run clinical trials and draw on the expertise in drug development that had previously
been controlled only by private sector companies. IOWH pioneered a model of private-publicnonprofit partnerships that pursued drug development projects for single diseases.
In 2006, IOWH secured approval from the Indian government to use intramuscular injections of
paromomycin to treat black fever. The antibiotic had been in use for more than 60 years but was
off patent. With $17 million in funding from the Gates Foundation, IOWH was able to establish
paromomycin’s efficacy as a low-cost treatment for black fever. Dr. Hale referred to this
approval as “a crowning moment. It was the proof of concept that a nonprofit pharmaceutical
company could get a drug approved” (Hayden 2007).
IOWH began focusing on other diseases – notably malaria, Chagas’ disease, and secretory
diarrhea – but sustainability became a concern. IOWH envisioned making medicines affordable
by selling their drugs in two-tiered pricing schedules: a very low price for public health agencies
and a market rate for commercial pharmacies. Such a scheme was hard to implement, however,
partly because large pharmaceutical companies began to donate drugs for use in the third world.
For example, pharma-company drug donations to USAID’s NTD program grew tenfold in the
past decade, from a value of $404 million in 2007 to $4.5 billion in 2016 (USAID 2017).
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Although IOWH was the first nonprofit pharmaceutical company in the U.S., it did not survive
as an independent entity. In 2011, IOWH became part of PATH, an international nonprofit
organization focused on improving the health of disadvantaged populations worldwide. PATH’s
proven access to philanthropic funding enabled the work envisioned by Dr. Hale to continue, but
IOWH’s unique business model was subsumed into that of a traditional (albeit successful) NGO.
When Dr. Hale stepped down as CEO of IOWH in 2007, she described her continuing vision for
solving neglected diseases:
I do believe that there are some diseases that are best treated without there being a
requirement for a return on investment or even a recouping of the R&D costs. The
technology’s there, the need is there, the passionate expertise is there. It just needs to be
housed in something that is a for-profit/not-for-profit hybrid, whatever you want to call it.
OneWorld Health’s model should have a second generation that has evolved (Nee 2007).
A dominant model for these second-generation “for-profit/not-for-profit hybrid” organizations
has yet to emerge. Innovative experiments abound, including the Genomics Institute of the
Novartis Research Foundation, a nonprofit organization founded in 1999 by the Swiss pharma
giant Novartis, the U.S. Government, and other foundations. The Institute straddles the world of
academic, nonprofit, and commercial science. So-called Product Development Partnerships are
another organizational form that involves collaboration among philanthropies, governments, and
corporations “to create health solutions for diseases of the poor in developing countries” (Topal
2014). Data collected by the World Health Organization, however, show that between 2007 and
2015, investments in PDPs for R&D on neglected diseases have declined from $540 million to
$450 million (World Health Organization 2017).
In short, the IOWH resulted from the efforts of an amphibious entrepreneur to solve a complex
problem: how to develop treatments for neglected tropical diseases in the absence of market
incentives to do so. The result was a radically new type of organization, the nonprofit
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pharmaceutical corporation. Although it successfully brought a treatment for black fever to
market in India, Dr. Hale’s innovation did not survive. Rather, IOWH was incorporated into a
more traditional nonprofit organization, while at the same time, for-profit pharma companies
stepped up their donations of drugs to treat neglected diseases.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing cases illustrate the basic mechanism of amphibious entrepreneurship: the
transposition of ideas, practices, and values from one social domain to another in which they are
essentially unknown. In each case, the transposition was effected by an individual whose focus
was on solving a problem: how to create an animated feature film digitally, how to ameliorate
third-world poverty, how to integrate two disparate musical styles, or how to develop drugs for
populations that cannot afford to pay for them. In their efforts to solve the problem, these
individuals drew on approaches and techniques that were natural or instinctive to them yet
radically different from the taken-for-granted approaches in the domains where the problem
resided. Ed Catmull brought organizing assumptions and a researcher’s ethos from academia to
(of all places) Hollywood. Jacqueline Novogratz could not suppress her international banker’s
perspective when confronted with the challenges of poverty. Carlos Santana inevitably heard and
played the blues through a Latin-tinged sensibility. Victoria Hale carried her knowledge of
overlooked pharmaceutical compounds to the arena of neglected tropical diseases. In the first
three cases, the entrepreneurs’ credibility and status in their domains of origin, coupled with
notable achievements in new domains, concatenated in unforeseen ways to trigger changes
beyond the scope of the original problem to be solved. In the fourth case, established patterns of
activity were ultimately insurmountable; the distinctive elements of Dr. Hale’s for-/non-profit
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hybrid were absorbed back into the commercial interests of the pharmaceutical industry and the
philanthropic interests of a successful NGO.
In the remainder of this chapter, we move from the specifics of these cases to broader
examination of the role of amphibious entrepreneurs in creating interstices between previously
separate social domains, and how this role differs from other boundary-spanning roles known to
be associated with the emergence of novelty. We also offer our perspective on potentially
promising directions for future research related to amphibiousness.
The creation of interstitial spaces
A crucial way in which amphibious entrepreneurs generate novelty is through the creation of
new border spaces between formerly separate lines of activity and thought. We call such spaces
interstices. Scholars have long recognized the fertility of such locations. Michael Mann (1986;
2012), in his magisterial History of Social Power, argues that interstices are the spaces at the
margins of previously dominant ideologies where transformational power leaps happen. These
power leaps remade civilizations and catapulted social upheavals that overthrew established
regimes. Physical and biological scientists view interstices as critical components of ecosystems
(e.g., the confluence of two rivers, or of a river and the ocean, that creates the organically rich
conditions that foster biodiversity).
In the world of culture, an interstice is a space where genres may be crossed and new visions
formed. The performance artist Lori Anderson sings, reads poetry, dances, and tries out odd
instruments at her concerts. The polymathic cellist Yo-Yo Ma is an interstitial bridge between
classic and bluegrass music, and he also plays with modern jazz and traditional Silk Road
musicians. Amphibious entrepreneurs create interstitial organizations that meld influences from
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different contexts; consequently, they inhabit gradated environments that are partly one thing and
partly another. The advantage of such an interstitial position is that ideas, practices, and
(importantly) values can be exchanged and boundary-crossing ties formed. Social resources from
one domain move to another with unusual repercussions. Formerly separate communities can be
brought together, which is particularly consequential when entirely new meanings emerge out of
such contexts.
Comparison to other boundary-spanning roles
Scholars have identified numerous roles that facilitate the confluence of ideas, practices, and
values across social boundaries. Table 1 compares and contrasts a few of these roles.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ]
Boundary spanners. Tushman and Scanlan’s (1981: 292) original characterization of the
boundary spanning role described an individual adept at “obtaining information from outside
units and disseminating this information to internal users.” Their focus was on information
transfer: knowledge from sources external to the organization was rendered comprehensible and
made available to internal constituents. Implicit in this definition is the boundary spanner’s
position as a member of an organization (or organizational unit) who translates knowledge from
outside the organization (or unit) for the benefit of the organization. Tushman and Scanlan’s
work is central to a rich and extensive literature on knowledge management and innovation.
The key similarity between boundary spanners and amphibious entrepreneurs is the notion of
transporting knowledge between domains. Indeed, recent studies build on March’s (1991)
observation that flows of human capital into and out of organizations bring opportunities for the
transfer of novel ideas and practices (Godart, Shipilov & Claes 2013). Thus, new hires have
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some amphibious qualities in that they bring assumptions and perspectives from other contexts to
their new employer and can (in some cases) maintain contact with their prior context, facilitating
ongoing exchange. The scope of such effects, however, is organizational. In contrast, amphibious
entrepreneurs operate as bridges between distinct domains of the social landscape, with the
possibility of larger-scale novelty (even when such novelty was not their original intent).
Mavericks. Patriotta and Hirsch (2016) describe an intriguing role in their exploration of
innovation in art worlds. They identify certain individuals, labeled “mavericks,” who occupy
positions at the periphery of existing fields and are thus able to flout convention and introduce
ideas and values that do not conform to established norms (Phillips & Zuckerman 2001). The
maverick and the amphibian are similar in their nonconformance, with key differences in scope
and intentionality. The maverick’s challenges to the existing order are calculated and deliberate;
she seeks to change prevailing institutional arrangements and does so within a defined
institutional field (Jones et al., 2016). The amphibian, on the other hand, lacks the antagonism
that characterizes the maverick; her countercultural intrusions result from immersion in one set
of assumptions and the naïve, unquestioned (indeed, almost inevitable) application of these
assumptions in a different domain.
Brokers. Brokers are typically individuals or select organizations located in particularly
advantageous structural positions. Brokers span holes in the social structure and are thus able to
control the flow of information or resources between separate parties. A broker then reaps
benefits from uniting two or more disconnected parties (Burt 1992). Such gains can be financial,
reputational, or political. Brokers bring disparate parties together to derive benefits. As such,
brokerage is based on the desire to use network position as a basis to garner different forms of
profit. In an important respect, brokerage is an import-export business (Burt 2004). Brokers can
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excel at conflict resolution in that they can communicate misunderstandings, bring awareness to
problems that both parties face, and build mutual insight. Brokers can transfer best practices
from one domain to another. And brokers can draw analogies that others might typically ignore,
thus overcoming the usual refrain of “our situation is different.” But brokerage rarely staples
together principles and practices from disparate domains or generates spillovers that are
advantageous to many others; nor does brokerage typically create new fields.
In contrast, amphibians provide services that bridge worlds that were formerly separate. As with
brokerage, older ideas take on a new life when used in a different setting. But this is not merely
import-export, as it modifies the new structure. Status earned in one domain is converted into
legitimacy in another, helping the new social category survive (Khaire 2010). In contrast, when
skills from one domain are moved to another, the repercussions are impossible to predict. By
synthesizing or recombining diverse ideas and elements from different groups, brokers can take
disparate contributions and create new uses for them that others build on (Long Lingo &
O’Mahony 2010). Such efforts always create tension because the transfer of ideas is not a simple
plug and play but has unexpected, ramifying effects.
In our examples above, formerly separate communities are brought together in a consequential
fashion as new meanings and new activities emerge out of such contacts. When a skill or purpose
is used in a different context, its functionality is redefined. Not only does the familiar thing take
on a different meaning in a new context, but also this new meaning is carried back into the
amphibian’s home domain. Amphibians not only build a bridge, they widen the bridge and create
a flow of traffic between different domains in ways that transform participants on both sides of
the bridge. Such actions result in not only an old idea doing a new job, but the idea itself being
transformed so that the topology of possibilities is altered in the two domains. Thus, although the
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success rate of brokers is likely much higher than that of amphibians, the consequences of
successful amphibiousness are potentially more profound.
Directions for future research
We have argued that amphibious entrepreneurs move ideas and practices from a domain where
they are familiar into another where they are alien and not initially recognized. Such boundary
crossing is charged with generative potential. To be sure, almost all novelty is “a recombination
of conceptual and physical materials that were previously in existence” (Nelson & Winter 1982:
130). We argue, however, that it matters a great deal whether recombination occurs on a familiar
terrain (e.g., an organization in the same or adjacent field or industry) or in a new or distant
setting where the components are foreign. This traffic across social worlds can create new social
spaces and repurpose existing cultural practices in unfamiliar circumstances, resulting in marked
departures from past practice.
Such boundary crossings typically involve considerable skill (Fligstein 1997). This raises the
question of who is most likely to engage successfully in such transpositions? Ambiguity of
action and speech are needed, as multi-vocal actors are able to hold positions across multiple
relations with variable meanings. This suggests that high-status individuals may be better able to
maintain a foot in two worlds, as they are better equipped to survive the antagonism they will
likely experience. In the early days of the biotech industry, for example, it was prestigious
scientists at elite universities who were able to create the first-generation of science-based
companies by using their research accomplishments to secure financing from young venture
capital firms. But none of these “scientists in business to do science” quit their academic day
jobs (Powell & Sandholtz, 2012b). The ability to move in two different social worlds was
enabled by their lofty standing in one established sphere. Is accomplishment in one realm a
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necessary requirement for amphibious entrepreneurs? Or is it possible for upstarts, without firm
footing in any domain, to simultaneously tack between realms, importing practices from one
sphere into another with transformative consequences? The case of Carlos Santana suggests that
low-status individuals from multi-ethnic backgrounds may be capable of toggling between
identities without experiencing ostracism. Future research could examine the relative status of
amphibians in different domains, focusing on whether the ability to frame arguments in multiple
registers is dependent on prior achievements in one domain (Stark 2009).
A related topic for further pursuit is the nature of cascading effects. What is the best way to
analyze the conditions under which effects from one domain spill promiscuously into others? Is
this a general process or always context-specific? How might such processes be studied
empirically? In his research on Renaissance Florence, John Padgett has documented how the
same actors’ actions in different contexts can have remarkably divergent consequences (Padgett
2012). His exceptionally detailed data on family, business, and political relations over two
centuries show that some network transpositions are more consequential than others and are
often context-dependent. How to measure these spillovers and shifts quantitatively remains a
challenge, although research on tactical repertoires in social movement studies shows such work
is feasible.
Relevant to the question of cascading effects is a more general examination of the temporal
characteristics of amphibious entrepreneurship. At what point in the development of an idea, a
technology, or a body of scientific findings does it become ripe for transposition to a distant
domain by an amphibious entrepreneur? And when are such moves most likely to take root? Ed
Catmull’s career history suggests that computer-generated animation had to reach a certain level
of sophistication before it could be successfully transposed to the world of Hollywood film
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making – and even when the technology was ready, Hollywood decision makers were
dismissive. Computer graphics research was in its infancy in 1974, when Catmull received his
Ph.D. He remained at the cutting edge of this research for the next 20 years, first in nonprofit
research labs and then in for-profit firms, before the release of Toy Story in 1995. A similarly
long gestation period characterized Jacqueline Novogratz’s founding of Acumen in 2001, after
unsuccessfully proposing the idea to her manager at Chase Manhattan Bank in 1986; he thought
the idea was absurd. Unpacking how individual readiness and societal poisedness interact to
enable amphibious action would make a considerable contribution to entrepreneurship research
(cf. Johnson & Powell 2017).
Finally, cultural sociologists have argued that there is an “art” to entrepreneurship (Peterson and
Berger, 1971; Johnson, 2007). Much more than just assembling pre-existing elements, cultural
entrepreneurship “extends to the moral, cultural, and social spheres as well” (Peterson and
Berger, 1971: 103). Similarly, in her work on the founding of the Paris Opera in the 17th
century, Johnson highlights the wide array of cultural elements involved in creating a new
organizational form. Historical sociologists stress that time is lumpy, unpredictable, and
discontinuous (Abbott 2001). Such a view alerts us, as Sewell (2005, p. 10) gracefully notes,
“that the consequences of a given act are not intrinsic in the act but rather will depend on the
nature of the social world within which it takes place.” Temporal heterogeneity renders some
actions—including efforts at organizational creation—incomprehensible or illegitimate at certain
historical moments, yet comprehensible and legitimate at others. Explaining when and why new
organizational forms emerge and persist calls for analysis of the relations between efforts at
invention and the social worlds in which those efforts unfold. Such historically informed study is
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largely missing from organizational research on entrepreneurship, which creates ample
opportunity to connect historical scholarship with entrepreneurship studies.
We began by asserting that social science is limited in its ability to explain novelty. Although we
have not solved this limitation, we suggest a line of work on amphibiousness, which illuminates
how new ideas emerge from connecting two distant social worlds. When these ideas concatenate
and gain traction, they can reverberate back into their domains of origin with powerful
transformative consequences.
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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Characteristics of Amphibians vs. Other Novelty-Generating Roles
Role

Structural position

Scope of novelty

Mechanism

Boundary spanner
(Tushman & Scanlan
1981)

Interface between organization
and environment

Within an organization

Translation

Maverick
(Patriotta & Hirsch 2016)

Peripheral member of
existing domain

Within a domain
(e.g., the art world)

Iconoclasm

Broker
(Burt 1992)

Bridging tie between nodes
in a social network

Between organizations or
domains

Arbitrage

Amphibious
entrepreneur

Trespasser in an unfamiliar
domain

Across multiple domains

Transposition

